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Key points 
 
 
 
• Across Britain as a whole, nearly 5m men and women of working age are out-of-
work on benefits.  Around 2.6m of these are on incapacity benefits. 
 
• The older industrial areas of the North, the Midlands, Scotland and Wales, and to a 
lesser extent a number of seaside towns and inner urban areas, have by far the 
highest claimant rates. 
 
• In the worst 100 districts outside London – home to almost a third of the UK 
population – an average of 18 per cent of all adults of working age are out-of-work 
on benefits. 
 
• Prior to the recession, the numbers out-of-work on benefits were falling, with the 
biggest reductions in the areas with the highest claimant rates.  The recession 
brought a halt to progress, and hit industrial areas the hardest. 
 
• To bring the employment rate in the worst 100 districts outside London up to the 
rate already found in the best third of the country would require an extra 1.2m 
residents in work. 
 
• Before the recession, employment was growing in Britain’s weakest local 
economies, but nearly 80 per cent of the job growth was in the public sector.  This 
points to the difficulties of relying on a private sector-led revival. 
 
• Looking ahead, even on favourable assumptions about a resumption (and 
acceleration) in the pre-recession decline in benefit numbers, there is little hope 
that benefit claimant rates in Britain’s weaker local economies will be reduced to 
acceptable levels by 2020 – at least not within the framework of present and 
planned policies. 
 
• The loss of public sector jobs looks likely to exacerbate the situation. 
 
• There is also little hope, within the present policy framework, of more than a 
marginal reduction in the gap in claimant rates between the best and worst parts of 
the country. 
 
• Pessimism about the prospects for a private sector-led revival, and a big fall in 
benefit numbers, is confirmed by two local case studies in the report (Barnsley and 
Blackpool). 
 
• There is a powerful case for job creation schemes, targeted at Britain’s weakest 
local economies, as an integral part of efforts to bring down benefit numbers. 
 
• The up-front annual cost to the Exchequer of creating 100,000 jobs for former 
incapacity benefit claimants would be around £1.2bn.  Allowing for benefit savings 
and additional tax revenue, the net cost to the Exchequer would be just £440m. 
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Foreword 
 
By Cllr Stephen Houghton CBE, Chair, National Worklessness Learning Forum 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Long-term unemployment or worklessness is one of the great evils of modern society.  
It blights individuals, their families, and communities, and costs the Exchequer 
significant amounts in benefits and lost revenue.  Little wonder the current Government 
has made tackling the problem a major priority, with almost five million people now 
reliant on some form of working-age benefit. 
 
However, the solutions to the problem are not always clear. 
 
Worklessness tends to concentrate in places, and the context and causes differ from 
place to place – indeed from person to person.  Previous one-size-fits-all, top-down 
solutions, whilst well intentioned, only reduced the problem at the margins.  Large 
numbers of workless people have remained reliant on benefits despite one of the 
longest periods of economic growth the country has seen. 
 
So can the problem be tackled in this new post-recession era, when growth forecasts 
are at best modest and public expenditure is being reduced on a scale not seen since 
the 1970s?  
 
The Government certainly thinks so, and has taken two significant and radical steps. 
 
First, the welfare system is to be reformed to make it more difficult for people to remain 
on long-term benefits and to make work a more attractive proposition.  Many will see 
their benefits reduced but at the same time be given the opportunity to carry them into 
work if they can find it. 
 
Second, a plethora of schemes and initiatives to help the unemployed will be pulled 
together in a new simplified Single Work Programme designed to give the unemployed 
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the personal support they need to find work.  Programmes will be designed by 
providers at the local level rather than at the centre. 
 
The Government believes the combination of these two changes will make significant 
inroads into the problem. 
 
It is clear that the Government believes that the problem of worklessness is one of 
labour supply, not labour demand.  Indeed, Ministers are convinced that the private 
sector has the ability not only to provide jobs for the large numbers currently out of 
work but also for those who are likely to lose their jobs as a result of the fiscal changes 
now being introduced. 
 
But is this the case? 
 
My experience from the National Worklessness Review, under the previous 
Government, is that in many of Britain’s weaker economies jobs are much harder to 
come by than in the economic powerhouse of the South East, and even there, in parts 
of East London and some coastal towns, employment is not always easily accessed. 
 
These concerns have been echoed in a series of reports from the Centre for Cities, the 
Work Foundation and the Conservative think tank the Policy Exchange, each of which 
has suggested that labour demand in weak economies is unlikely to improve and that 
the unemployed in those areas are unlikely to find work unless they move to more 
prosperous parts, particularly in the South of England. 
 
However, encouraging large numbers of people to move is not easy, and the health 
and family circumstances of the most vulnerable mean that significant migration by 
these men and women is unlikely.  In poorer areas this unwillingness to move is likely 
to be reinforced by proposed changes to the Housing Benefit system.  On top of this, 
the prospect of moving is made more difficult by the large numbers of EU economic 
migrants now competing for work in the UK’s most successful places.  Only last year 
the Prime Minister himself distanced the Conservatives from the comments of the 
Policy Exchange, who had suggested North-South economic migration was the 
solution. 
 
Against this background it is clear that if worklessness is to be reduced, and if the 
Government’s new policies are to work, then jobs have to be both available and 
accessible across a range of places. 
 
As a result of these concerns, the National Worklessness Forum commissioned 
Sheffield Hallam University to try to establish a picture of demand over the next ten 
years, particularly in weaker local economies, to see just how the Government’s new 
policies are likely to impact and to propose, if necessary, additional policy changes to 
ensure neither people nor places get left behind. 
 
As you will see, the findings of the report are stark.  In many of Britain’s weaker 
economies, particularly post-industrial towns and cities and some coastal towns, job 
demand in the private sector is low and unlikely to grow significantly.  The bulk of those 
most distant from work in these places are likely, without extra help, to remain so for 
the next ten years at least. 
 
If the consequences of welfare reform and the Single Work Programme are not simply 
to leave many people on less benefit income without the prospect of employment, 
demand needs stimulating.  This can and should come through investment in skills, 
enterprise and support for businesses.  However, whilst these interventions can help to 
7 
 
create employment (as we have seen over the last decade) they are at best long-term 
measures, so something needs to be done now to ensure large numbers are not left 
isolated yet again. 
 
My view, and that of the report, is that job creation programmes are needed for the 
most vulnerable in the most vulnerable places. 
 
Of course, job creation programmes need both funding and the capacity to deliver 
them. 
 
On the question of capacity, the Future Jobs Fund has shown that local councils, the 
voluntary sector and many other organisations have both the appetite and the 
organisational strength to deliver quality employment opportunities for the young and 
the long-term unemployed alike.  Moreover, the development of Local Enterprise 
Partnerships in England – all of whom have made worklessness a key issue – is 
another opportunity to deliver, particularly across functional economic areas.  So we 
can be confident capacity on the ground is there. 
 
On funding, however, we are in very different circumstances to those when the Future 
Jobs Fund was introduced.  The Government is reducing spending dramatically as it 
attempts to shrink the structural deficit.  So where would the money come from? 
 
There is no doubt in my mind that there is capacity in the financial sector to pay for 
such a programme, given the current size of banks’ annual bonus pool (around £7bn).  
Indeed, all the political parties have suggested that the banks need to contribute more 
to the challenges the country faces.  An initial levy of £1.2bn could be used to establish 
a programme of employment for 100,000 people in the UK’s most vulnerable 
economies.  Thereafter, this could be reduced to £400-500m a year to sustain it. 
 
I believe there would be strong public support for an initiative that ensured that those 
most at risk from the financial and economic problems the country faces were 
supported by the institutions that were responsible for those problems in the first place. 
 
Our aim in commissioning this report was not to criticise the Government’s objectives – 
which we share – or to dismiss its policy initiatives.  But we believe the evidence shows 
they won’t be enough.  If many people and places aren’t to be left behind, more must 
be done. 
 
If the Single Work Programme idea of payment by results (i.e. a job) is to succeed, 
there need to be real outcomes that contractors can achieve if their business models 
are to be viable.  Placing people on training programmes with nowhere to go will 
benefit neither the contractors nor the unemployed. 
 
It is my sincere hope that all the major political parties will finally accept and 
understand the nature of worklessness – particularly in those weaker economies – and 
be prepared to work with us to deliver real solutions. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Professor Steve Fothergill and his team, and the Borough 
Councils of Blackpool and Barnsley who helped fund the project and provided the 
evidence for the case studies. 
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1.  THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The national picture 
 
Worklessness is one of Britain’s major social and economic problems.  In the years of 
economic growth prior to 2008 the extremely large numbers of men and women still 
out-of-work on benefits tended to be overlooked, not least because the trend was in the 
right direction.  But in reality the long economic boom never did come near to creating 
‘full employment’ and the subsequent recession ratcheted up the jobless numbers once 
again. 
 
Worklessness on benefits is a lot wider than just ‘unemployment’.  Table 1 shows the 
number of men and women of working age1 in receipt of out-of-work benefits across 
Great Britain as a whole.  The figures here are four-quarter averages for 20092.  The 
table shows that even in the wake of recession the 1.45m out-of-work on Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA) – the main benefit for the unemployed – are far exceeded by the 2.6m 
on incapacity benefits (principally Incapacity Benefit (IB) itself but also Income Support 
(IS) paid on grounds of incapacity and the new Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA)).  A further 0.7m claimed Income Support as lone parents.  In total, just under 
5m adults of working age are out-of-work on benefits.  This represents more than 13 
per cent of the entire working age population. 
 
 
Table 1: Non-employed working age benefit claimants, GB, 2009 
  
 
Number 
  
  
Jobseeker’s Allowance 1,450,000 
Incapacity benefits 2,610,000 
Income Support as lone parent 720,000 
Other income-based benefits  180,000 
  
  
TOTAL 4,960,000 
 
Figures are four-quarter averages 
Source: DWP 
                                            
1
 16-64 for men, 16-59 for women.  The difference reflects the ages at which men and women are 
presently entitled to state pension, but from 2010 onwards the pension age for women is gradually being 
raised to the same age as for men. 
2
 Since the figures presented in this report were compiled, new data for February 2010 has become 
available for IB/ESA and for IS.  JSA data is published monthly.  The more recent data differs only very 
marginally.  Four-quarter data is used here to avoid distortions arising from seasonal fluctuations, 
especially in some local areas such as seaside towns. 
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The differences between places 
 
The continuing scale of worklessness on benefits is, in fairness, gradually seeping into 
political debate and wider public consciousness.  What still tends to get overlooked, 
however, is the extent to which the problem is unevenly spread around the country. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the share of adults out-of-work on benefits (the ‘working age 
benefit claimant rate’) by district3.  The benefits included here are JSA for the 
unemployed, IB/IS/ESA for the sick and disabled, and IS for lone parents and others4.  
These figures are new: previous studies have tended to concentrate on component 
parts of the jigsaw rather than the overall picture. 
 
What is immediately apparent is that there are enormous differences in the working 
age benefit claimant rate between different parts of the country.  What’s more, these 
differences follow a clear pattern.  Anyone with a reasonable knowledge of the 
geography of Britain will recognise that the places with the highest claimant rates are 
predominantly the older industrial areas of the North, Scotland and Wales.  To a lesser 
extent a number of seaside towns and inner urban areas also have high claimant rates.  
In contrast, there is a large part of southern England outside London where the working 
age benefit claimant rate is much lower. 
 
To underline this point, Table 2 shows the top 20 and bottom 10 GB districts in terms of 
their working age benefit claimant rate5.  At the extremes, in Blaenau Gwent and in 
Merthyr Tydfil in the South Wales Valleys the claimant rate exceeds 26 per cent of all 
adults of working age.  In Hart district in Hampshire the rate is below 5 per cent. 
 
The list of the top 20 districts is dominated by older industrial areas.  The South Wales 
Valleys are particularly strongly represented, but the list also includes substantial cities 
such as Liverpool, Glasgow, Stoke on Trent and Hull.  Two seaside towns (Blackpool 
and Hastings) feature on the list, and a single London borough (Hackney) creeps in at 
number 20.  In contrast, all the ten districts with the lowest claimant rates are in the 
south and east of England outside London. 
                                            
3
 The figures here and elsewhere in the report are all for pre-2009 districts, i.e. before the creation of the 
new unitary counties in parts of England.  Figures for the new unitary counties obscure important local 
variations, notably in Northumberland, Durham and Cornwall. 
4
 Because of benefit rules and the way that the figures are assembled there is no double-counting between 
these groups. 
5
 There are just over 400 districts in all in Great Britain. 
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Figure 1: Working age benefit claimant rate, England and Wales, 2009 
Source: DWP
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Figure 2: Working age benefit claimant rate, Scotland, 2009 
 
Source: DWP 
 
Table 2: Working age benefit claimant rate, 2009 
 
      % of working age population 
 Top 20 districts 
Blaenau Gwent 26.7 Caerphilly 22.1 
Merthyr Tydfil 26.5 Blackpool 22.0 
Easington 24.5 Wear Valley 21.3 
Knowsley 24.2 Inverclyde 21.3 
Liverpool 24.2 Stoke on Trent 21.1 
Glasgow 22.8 Wolverhampton 21.0 
Neath Port Talbot 22.6 West Dunbartonshire 21.0 
Rhondda Cynon Taff 22.5 Hull 20.7 
Hartlepool 22.3 Hastings 20.6 
Middlesbrough 22.2 Hackney 20.6 
Bottom 10 districts 
S Buckinghamshire 6.0 Elmbridge 5.7 
Runnymede 5.9 S Northamptonshire 5.5 
S Cambridgeshire 5.9 Rutland 5.1 
W Oxfordshire 5.8 Wokingham 4.9 
Surrey Heath 5.8 Hart 4.7 
Source: DWP
% of working age
17.5  +
15  to 17.5
12.5  to 15
10  to 12.5
<10
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Making sense of the differences 
 
In all, there are 112 districts across Britain where the working age benefit claimant rate 
exceeds 15 per cent.  These fall neatly into two groups: 
 
• The worst 100 districts outside London (pop 18.8m) 
• The worst 12 London boroughs (pop 2.8m) 
 
At the other end of the spectrum there are 142 districts, mainly but not exclusively in 
southern England, with a combined population of 15.8m, where the working age benefit 
claimant rate is less than 10 per cent. 
 
Table 3 looks at non-employment in these ‘worst’ and ‘best’ districts6.  ‘Non-
employment’ is wider than just worklessness on benefit.  It includes early retirees, 
students in full-time education, parents who have dropped out of the labour market to 
look after children, and even some jobseekers who do not claim benefit.  What this 
table shows is that this diverse group of ‘other inactive’ outside the benefits system is 
found in much the same numbers in the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ districts – the 12 London 
boroughs have slightly more but this is a reflection, in part, of a very high student 
population. 
 
 
Table 3: Non-employment, 2009 
% of working age 
On benefits Other inactive Total 
   
    Worst 100 outside London 18.6 13.4 32.0 
Worst 12 London boroughs 17.3 17.0 34.3 
Best 142 districts 7.9 13.6 21.5 
GB average 13.4 13.7 27.1 
Sources: DWP, APS 
 
 
By contrast, the proportion out-of-work on benefits varies enormously between the best 
and worst parts of Britain.  In the worst 100 districts outside London, the average 
claimant rate – 18.6 per cent of all adults between 16 and state pension age – is more 
than 10 percentage points higher than in the best 142 districts across the country. 
 
Table 4 looks at who makes up the working age benefit claimants in the worst 100 
districts outside London.  In total nearly 2.1m claimants live in these 100 districts.  By 
far the largest group (nearly 1.2m) are incapacity benefit claimants.  A further 0.6m are 
                                            
6
 This table combines DWP benefits data and figures from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  A small 
number of benefit claimants do not count as non-employed in the LFS because they undertake ‘permitted 
work’ for a few hours a week.  In this table the effect is to slightly underestimate the number of ‘other 
inactive’. 
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JSA claimants and nearly 300,000 claim Income Support as lone parents.  The longer-
term claimants are dominated by incapacity benefits to an even greater extent – in the 
worst 100 districts outside London, more than 1m men and women have been out-of-
work on incapacity benefits for at least a year.  This compares to just 79,000 on JSA for 
at least a year, though it is worth bearing in mind that the figures here (for 2009) are 
unlikely to reflect the full and final impact of recession on the number of long-term JSA 
claimants. 
 
Table 4: Working age benefit claimants, worst 100 districts outside London, 2009 
   
 
All claimants Claimants 1yr + 
   
   Jobseeker’s Allowance 626,000 79,000 
Incapacity benefits 1,169,000 1,003,000 
IS as lone parent 291,000 220,000 
   Source: DWP 
 
 
Trends before and after the recession 
 
Table 5 shows the change in the working age benefit claimant rate between 1999 and 
2008.  The recession began in earnest in the latter part of 2008 and took a while to 
impact on benefit numbers, so this table essentially looks at pre-recession trends.  
District-level data on all the key benefits is only available as far back as 1999 so the 
figures exclude the preceding period of strong economic growth when claimant 
unemployment fell sharply. 
 
 
Table 5: Pre-recession trends, all working age benefits, 1999-2008 
Change as % working age 
Worst 100 outside London -330,000 -3.7 
Worst 12 London boroughs -51,000 -4.7 
Best 142 districts -42,000 -0.9 
GB -565,000 -2.4 
Source: DWP 
 
 
As might be expected, in a period of sustained economic growth benefit numbers did 
fall – by more than 0.5m after 1999.  What’s more, they fell fastest in the parts of Britain 
where worklessness on benefit was highest.  Expressed as a share of the working age 
population, benefit numbers fell four times faster in the worst 100 districts outside 
London than in the best 142 across the country.  In the worst 12 London boroughs the 
proportional reduction was even greater.  Just how much this narrowing of the gaps 
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across Britain was the result of policy interventions is unclear: it could be that, since 
worklessness on benefits was always quite low in parts of southern England, it had little 
scope to fall still further. 
 
The impact of recession is shown in Figure 3.  This shows the percentage point 
increase in the claimant rate of each of the three main working age benefits between 
2008 and 2009.  The increase in benefit numbers during the recession was 
overwhelmingly an increase in the number of JSA claimants.  The number of incapacity 
claimants was barely affected, and the number of lone parents claiming Income 
Support actually fell slightly, reflecting the impact of new benefit rules.  The 
disappointing aspect of trends during the recession was that the good progress in the 
worst 100 districts outside London was halted and reversed: on average these districts 
experienced the largest increases in JSA numbers. 
 
 
Figure 3: Impact of recession: Increase in working age claimant rate 2008 to 2009  
1.9
0.0
-0.1
1.6
0.1
-0.3
1.1
0.1
0.0
1.6
0.0
-0.1
JSA
IB etc
IS (LP)
JSA
IB etc
IS (LP)
JSA
IB etc
IS (LP)
JSA
IB etc
IS (LP)
as % of working age
Best 142 
districts
GB
Worst  12 
London boroughs
 
Source: DWP 
 
 
A shortage of jobs? 
 
To what extent does the high level of worklessness in certain parts of the country 
reflect a lack of demand for labour, or does it reflect failures in labour supply, such as 
low skills and low motivation?  In other words, are people out-of-work because there 
aren’t enough jobs or because they have low employability? 
 
This is a key debate in economics and it is inappropriate to repeat all the arguments 
here.  However, there are two key observations that in the present context point 
strongly to a shortage of jobs as the underlying cause of the high levels of 
worklessness on benefits in Britain’s weaker local economies: 
 
Worst 100 
outside London 
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• When the industries of older industrial Britain were still working, the numbers on 
benefits, especially incapacity benefits, were far lower.  In coalmining areas, for 
example, the big increase in IB numbers only occurred after the pits were 
closed. 
 
• In the parts of Britain where the economy is strongest, most especially in the 
parts of southern England that escaped relatively unscathed from the de-
industrialisation of the 1980s and 90s, the working age claimant rate (and 
especially the IB rate) has consistently been far lower. 
 
Added to this it is hard to ascribe the increase in JSA claimant numbers during the 
recession to anything other than a fall in the demand for labour. 
 
Nor does the influx of migrant workers, especially from the EU accession states such 
as Poland, undermine the argument that a shortage of jobs lies at the heart of the 
problem in Britain’s weaker local economies.  Reliable data on the location of migrants 
is hard to come by – the best figures are for National Insurance registrations by foreign 
nationals, which show where in the country they first registered for work.  Table 6 
presents these numbers in index number form for a selection of districts where the 
working age claimant rate is well above average.  A figure of 100 would indicate that a 
district had the national average share of registrations by foreign workers.  Figures 
below 100 indicate a below-average share of migrant workers; figures above 100 an 
above-average share. 
 
 
Table 6: New NI registrations by foreign workers, selected districts, 2002-2009 
    UK average=100 
Blaenau Gwent 20 Redcar and Cleveland 11 
Easington 10 East Ayrshire 11 
Knowsley  14 Gateshead 40 
Stoke on Trent  79 Doncaster 62 
South Tyneside 45 Bolsover 19 
Sunderland  40 
Barnsley  28 Hackney 328 
St Helens 22 Newham 583 
Sources: 100% extract from National Insurance Recording System, ONS 
 
The striking feature is that the districts outside London covering older industrial areas, 
where worklessness on benefits is widespread, have attracted substantially less than 
their fair share of migrant workers.  The main cities and some metropolitan districts 
have generally attracted more than smaller towns, but districts such as Blaenau Gwent 
in Wales and Easington in County Durham – both at the very top in terms of their 
working age claimant rate – have attracted hardly any migrant workers at all. 
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The London boroughs are different.  The two shown in Table 6 – Hackney and 
Newham – have both attracted far more migrants in relation to their population.  In 
these places, at least, there is a case for arguing that migrant workers may have 
compounded the local problem of worklessness.  On the other hand, it could be argued 
that in the mid-2000s the over-heated London economy may well have simply grown 
faster because of the inflow of labour from abroad. 
 
Migrant workers from abroad may fill jobs in London that might otherwise have gone to 
migrants from the northern regions of the UK, thereby keeping them in the North 
instead and maintaining an over-supply of labour in difficult labour markets.  Families 
with children have traditionally found it difficult to move from the North to the South 
because of the cost and availability of housing, but there has for many years been a 
steady flow of younger, single men and women from the North into London in 
particular. It is perhaps the lower-skilled among this group that has been most exposed 
to competition from migrant workers from abroad.  On the other hand it is harder, on 
the basis of the figures, to argue that direct displacement within the North itself 
contributes more than marginally to worklessness. 
 
The most persistent argument deployed against the idea that there is a shortage of 
jobs is that there are plenty of vacancies just about everywhere.  Even where the 
vacancies are not on claimants’ doorstep, there are usually plenty further down the 
road, the argument goes. 
 
The trouble with this argument is that it fundamentally misunderstands the role of 
‘vacancies’ in the labour market.  Most vacancies are not hard-to-fill positions that 
nobody wants or has the skills to match.  Most vacancies are not newly-created jobs 
either.  Most represent the vacancies created by the normal turnover of staff as people 
leave one job and take up another.  Since up to a third of the workforce changes job 
every year7, large numbers of vacancies are generated just about everywhere all of the 
time.  A substantial flow of vacancies could be expected even, for example, if there 
were 10 million claimant unemployed – though that would clearly not negate the idea 
that there was a shortage of jobs. 
 
The problem for out-of-work claimants is that some are far better placed than others to 
fill the vacancies that arise.  The newly-unemployed with reasonable qualifications and 
good health are perhaps the best placed; the long-term sick with poor qualifications 
and skills are probably the most disadvantaged.  The ‘queue for jobs’ does not operate 
like, for example, a bus queue.  The fit and well-qualified stand at the front and fill the 
vacancies first, and are constantly replaced at the head of the queue by other fit and 
well-qualified workers leaving or losing a job.  The sick and poorly-qualified stay at the 
back.  They only ever reach the front of the queue if the economy is strong enough to 
absorb just about all the fitter and better-qualified. 
 
The solution to the high worklessness in places like Blaenau Gwent in South Wales 
and Easington in County Durham is not simply that they should travel further to work.  
In neighbouring areas where jobs are more plentiful they may increase their chances of 
                                            
7
 Turnover does vary with the trade cycle, with the highest turnover in times of strong growth. 
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finding work, but even there a fit and well-qualified worker will be preferred to one with 
low skills and poor health.  And if they do find work they may simply do so at the 
expense of someone else.  What matters, ultimately, is that there are enough jobs in 
total in the local and regional economy. 
 
 
The jobs gap 
 
The scale of the challenge in reducing worklessness in Britain’s weaker local 
economies is best measured by ‘employment rates’ – the share of adults of working 
age who have jobs.  In 2008/98 the average employment rate among residents in the 
worst 100 districts outside London was just 68 per cent, compared to a GB average of 
73 per cent and an average in the best 142 districts of just under 79 per cent.  
Translated into hard numbers, for the worst 100 districts outside London this implies 
that: 
 
• To reach the GB average employment rate would require 570,000 additional 
residents in employment 
 
• To reach the average employment rate in the best 142 districts would require 
1,220,000 additional residents in employment 
 
For the 12 worst London boroughs, the equivalent calculations point to an extra 
140,000 and 250,000 residents in employment. 
 
These are large numbers by any standards.  To illustrate the point, Table 7 looks at the 
scale of the jobs gap in five specific areas.  The former Yorkshire coalfield for example 
(defined here as the boroughs of Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham and Wakefield) 
would require an additional 60,000 residents in work to raise the local employment rate 
to the average already found in the best 142 districts up and down the country.  
Teesside would require 40,000.  For Merseyside the figure is 100,000. 
 
 
Table 7: The jobs gap in selected districts 
To raise residents employment rate to: 
GB average Level in best 142 districts 
Welsh Valleys 38,000 64,000 
Teesside 20,000 40,000 
Yorkshire coalfield 24,000 60,000 
Merseyside 55,000 100,000 
Glasgow City 30,000 51,000 
Source: SHU calculations based on APS
                                            
8
 October 2008-September 2009 
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Employment trends 
 
Up to the recession at least, there was progress in the right direction.  Figure 4 shows 
the trends in employment9 between 1999 and 2008, nationally and in the different 
groups of districts.  On average, the worst 100 districts outside London experienced 
similar employment growth to the GB average, and to the average for the best 142 
districts.  The London boroughs fared rather better, though there is volatility in the year-
by-year data. 
 
 
Figure 4: Employment trends, 1999-2008 
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The balance of this employment growth between the public and private sectors, shown 
in Table 8, is more concerning.  The ‘public sector’ is defined here as all the jobs in 
public administration and defence, health and education10.  This shows that job growth 
in the worst 100 districts outside London was overwhelmingly underpinned by the 
public sector – 460,000 additional jobs in the public sector compared to just 130,000 in 
the private sector.  In the best 142 districts the balance was far more even, with the 
public and private sectors each contributing around a third of a million new jobs.  In the 
worst 12 London boroughs the split between the public and private sectors was also 
fairly even. 
 
                                            
9
 The figures are for employees in employment, from the ABI, and exclude the self-employed.  The figures 
have been adjusted, on the basis of statistics by district and by SIC group, for discontinuities in the ABI 
data in 2006.  The 2008 figures are for December and are the most up-to-date figures available at the time 
of writing. 
10
 In effect, these are the jobs supported directly by public spending.  In strict statistical terms the public 
sector also includes employees of public corporations (such as the Post Office) and of the banks owned in 
large part by the state. 
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Across Britain as a whole in the years 1999-2008, the balance between public and 
private sector job growth was 60:40 in favour of the public sector.  This does not auger 
well for an era of public spending cuts.  But most particularly, the trends up to 2008 in 
the weaker local economies outside London do not inspire confidence that job growth 
in the private sector will easily take over from the public sector. 
 
 
Table 8: Public vs private sector job growth, 1999-2008 
 
Public sector* Private sector 
Worst 100 outside London 460,000 130,000 
Worst 12 London boroughs 70,000 80,000 
Best 142 districts 330,000 340,000 
GB 1,370,000 910,000 
*Public admin & defence, health, education 
Source: ABI 
 
 
Scenarios to 2020 
 
So what is the best that might realistically be achieved in terms of a reduction in 
worklessness in the coming years?  To explore the possibilities four scenarios can 
usefully be explored.  None of these is intended to be a forecast of what will actually 
happen; rather, they are attempts to sketch out what might happen if all went well for 
the present government.  The trends in benefit numbers over the 1999-2008 period are 
the starting point because this was a period of sustained economic growth and job 
creation and, in many respects a favourable macroeconomic backdrop against which to 
reduce claimant numbers.  The four scenarios are: 
 
• A resumption of pre-recession local trends in benefit numbers 
 
• A resumption of the pre-recession national decline in benefit numbers, spread 
evenly across all areas 
 
• A doubling of the pre-recession national decline in benefit numbers, spread 
evenly across all areas 
 
• A resumption the pre-recession local trends plus a doubling of the national 
decline in benefit numbers 
 
The four scenarios each imply a different geography but each one builds in a national 
decline in benefit numbers, at a minimum at the national rate in the years leading up to 
the recession.  Since the new government is implementing major welfare reforms 
intended to lower benefit numbers an acceleration in the national decline might be 
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expected.  On the other hand it is generally acknowledged that that the wider economic 
context may be more difficult in the coming years than in the years up to 2008. 
 
Figure 5 shows the results of these calculations for working age benefit claimant rates 
in the worst 100 districts outside London11.  In all four scenarios the claimant rate, 
expressed as a percentage of the working age population, falls from its 2010 level.  
The reduction is largest if a resumption in pre-recession local trends is combined with a 
doubling in the overall national reduction. 
 
 
Figure 5: Positive scenarios to 2020, worst 100 districts outside London 
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Source: Sheffield Hallam based on DWP data 
 
 
The concerning aspect of these scenarios is revealed by Table 9.  For each of the 
different groups of districts this shows the range of benefit claimant rates in 2020 that 
would arise from the four scenarios.  What this reveals is that despite all the scenarios 
implying a reduction in benefit numbers, by 2020 the claimant rate in the worst 100 
districts outside London would remain high – between 12 and 16 per cent of all adults 
of working age.  For the worst 12 London boroughs the rate would be only a little lower 
– 11 to 15 per cent.  Furthermore, the gap between these districts and the average in 
the best 142 districts in the country (coming in at 3 to 7 per cent) would remain 
enormous. 
 
 
                                            
11
 The calculations use 2009 benefits data as the 2010 starting point. 
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Table 9:  Positive scenarios to 2020 
Share of working age out-of-work 
on benefits 
Worst 100 districts outside London 12 – 16 % 
Worst 12 London boroughs 11 – 15 % 
Best 142 districts   3 – 7   % 
GB   8 – 10 % 
Source: Sheffield Hallam based on DWP data 
 
All these scenarios are arguably too favourable.  One of the few apparent certainties 
about the coming years is that there are likely to be large public sector job cuts.  It is 
useful therefore to modify the scenarios to include: 
 
• 600,000 public sector job losses in the period to 201512, spread evenly around 
the country 
 
• A further 600,000 knock-on job losses in the private sector by 2015, again 
spread evenly around the country 
 
• An assumption that 75 per cent of these job losses lead to an increase in 
benefit numbers 
 
The last of these assumptions doesn’t imply that it will be the redundant workers 
themselves who will necessarily add to benefit rolls.  In practice, many of them will find 
work, but often at the expense of others.  The intention here is to model overall labour 
market outcomes. 
 
Figure 6 looks again at working age benefit claimant rates in the worst 100 districts 
outside London using these modified assumptions.  It is immediately apparent that on 
these less favourable but realistic assumptions there is little prospect that claimant 
rates in 2020 will be more than marginally lower than in 2010.  Indeed, by 2015 there 
may have been no reduction at all. 
 
 
                                            
12
 This is the number of public sector job losses identified by the Office for Budget Responsibility at the 
time of the of the June 2010 budget.  The October 2010 Spending Review points to smaller numbers 
(490,000).  Other commentators, for example the Chartered Institute for Personnel Development, have 
suggested the figure could be as high as 750,000. 
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Figure 6: Realistic scenarios? Worst 100 districts outside London 
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Source: Sheffield Hallam based on DWP data 
 
Too much weight ought not to be placed on any of these scenarios.  To repeat, they 
are not an attempt to forecast what will happen but rather an attempt to explore what 
might happen if certain trends were to arise.  Collectively, however, the scenarios do 
point to two alarming conclusions: 
 
• Even on favourable assumptions, in Britain’s weaker local economies 
there is little hope of reducing worklessness on benefits to acceptable 
levels within the next ten years – at least not within the framework of 
existing and planned policy 
 
• There is also little hope, within the present policy framework, of more than 
a marginal narrowing in the gap between the best and worst parts of the 
country. 
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2.  THE CASE FOR RADICAL ACTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If, within the framework of present policies, there is little hope of reducing worklessness 
in Britain’s weaker local economies to acceptable levels there is a good case for 
exploring radical alternatives.  There are three main possibilities: 
 
• A private sector-led economic revival to generate more jobs 
 
• Reduced availability of benefits 
 
• Job creation schemes 
 
 
A private sector revival? 
 
Few would argue against the desirability of a private sector revival.  What is at issue is 
whether it is achievable, especially against the backdrop of public spending cuts that 
directly and indirectly reduce the demand for private sector goods and services. 
 
The long period of economic growth up to 2008 was in many respects a very 
favourable period for private sector growth.  UK consumer spending was rising, and 
there was strong growth in potential export markets.  It was also an era in which private 
sector growth in the weakest local economies was often strongly supported and 
encouraged by public policy, for example through the Regional Development Agencies 
in England.  Yet the job outcomes in the private sector, shown in Table 8 earlier, at 
910,000 additional jobs across Britain as a whole between 1999 and 2008 were still 
less than the 1.4 million jobs growth seen in the public sector. 
 
The lower exchange rate and lower interest rates that flowed from the recession should 
in theory promote private sector growth but the scope for major new stimuli looks 
distinctly limited in an era of deficit reduction.  Indeed, as the local case studies later in 
the report show all too clearly, there is pessimism about the likely extent of a private 
sector revival in the near future.  At this stage at least, only a very brave commentator 
would back the private sector to generate jobs on the scale that is needed. 
 
There are also legitimate concerns about exactly where across Britain any new private 
sector jobs might be located.  In broad terms, the South of England has a much better 
track record in this regard than the rest of the country.  As Table 8 also showed, in the 
decade or so prior to the recession the districts with the lowest claimant rates, mostly in 
the South, generated far more new private sector jobs than the districts where benefit 
claimant rates are highest.  This would normally be seen as providing a strong 
justification for regional policy, to raise the performance of the private sector in the 
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areas where it is weakest.  The demise of the English Regional Development Agencies 
and the curtailment of regional grants to businesses13 suggest that regional policy is 
being weakened rather than strengthened.  The new Regional Growth Fund, intended 
to support private sector job creation, has a much lower budget than the RDAs and is 
potentially available across the whole of England. 
 
A private sector revival needs to lie at the heart of the long-term revival of Britain’s 
weaker local economies.  But delivering this looks likely to be a long haul, and one that 
needs not just the right national economic environment but also targeted support for 
economic regeneration in the places that need it most. 
 
 
Welfare reform 
 
But what of the government’s efforts to bring down benefit numbers through welfare 
reform? 
 
Although the government has emphasised the need to limit the impact of spending 
reductions on the most vulnerable members of society, at the same time it has major 
concerns over what it sees as an over-dependence on welfare benefits.  In particular, it 
characterises the welfare system as offering insufficient incentives for people to move 
into paid employment, thus compounding other practical barriers faced by those on 
benefits in escaping poverty.  A central theme here is the need for a rebalancing 
between citizens' rights and responsibilities, particularly for those who are in receipt of 
'inactive' benefits such as Incapacity Benefit and Income Support. 
 
The DWP consultation paper 21st Century Welfare, issued in July 2010, argues that 
the "benefits system as it stands often provides incentives to stay on benefits rather 
than take a job".  This is seen as resulting partly from the complexity of the system, in 
terms of the number of different benefit payments available and their varying eligibility 
rules, and partly from the often perverse ways in which it interacts with income from 
employment and the taxation system.  Key proposals are therefore intended to simplify 
the system, to make it more transitional so that men and women are financially better 
off moving into work. 
 
Whether financial incentives really do work in this way is far from clear.  There will no 
doubt be circumstances in which some individuals face disincentives to working but the 
general experience of ‘better-off calculations’, often reported by Jobcentre Plus staff, is 
that most claimants would already be financially better off in work.  Moreover, the vast 
majority of incapacity claimants, for example, see their health or disability, not their 
finances, as the principal obstacle to looking for work or taking up a job14.  The financial 
disincentives to work are likely to be most common among those who might take up 
low-wage part-time employment, and it is perhaps this group that stands to benefit 
most from forthcoming reforms. 
                                            
13
 Grants for Business Investment, the main form of financial support to companies to protect or create 
jobs in the English Assisted Areas, is effectively suspended at the present time. 
14
 See for example the extensive survey work reported in C Beatty et al (2009) Women on Incapacity 
Benefits, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University. 
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An integral part of the government’s approach is that the level of conditionality should 
be determined by the reason for receiving benefit.  Those deemed fit for work will be 
expected to take active steps to find employment, as at present with Jobseeker’s 
Allowance.  Others will be encouraged to prepare themselves for work, by agreeing to 
receive help to overcome the barriers they face or by taking on jobs for relatively limited 
hours each week in the first instance.  For example, lone parents whose youngest child 
is seven will, from October 2010 onwards, lose entitlement to Income Support and the 
plan is to extend this to lone parents whose youngest child is five. 
 
The reform of incapacity benefits, initiated by the Labour government, will continue.  
New claimants are already subject to a new, tougher medical assessment – the Work 
Capability Assessment – and the intention is that, beginning in October 2010, all 
existing incapacity claimants will be called in for the new test by 2014.  Some of those 
who are judged fit for work will sign on for Jobseeker’s Allowance instead, but if they 
have no entitlement to income-based JSA because of other household income or 
savings they will be pushed out of the benefits system altogether.  For the majority of 
those who move across onto the new incapacity benefit, Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA), the benefit will in future come with conditions requiring them to 
engage in activity intended to prepare them for work. 
 
Following the Comprehensive Spending Review, even those who remain on the work-
related element of ESA will in future only be entitled to one year’s non-means tested 
benefit.  If they have a partner in work, or a substantial pension or significant savings 
they will no longer qualify and be pushed out of the benefits system altogether. 
 
The effect of welfare reform can therefore be expected to reduce benefit numbers by 
denying access to some, to promote greater labour market attachment for others, and 
to make employment a more financially worthwhile option.  The scale of the reduction 
in numbers remains unclear, particularly because the impact of the new medical test on 
the numbers of existing, longer-term incapacity remains unknown.  Also, it remains 
unclear just how many ESA claimants might be pushed off benefit altogether by the 
wider application of means-testing.  A prudent assumption might be that incapacity 
benefit numbers might be reduced by one million by 2015, of whom half might be 
pushed out of the benefits system altogether. 
 
 
The Work Programme 
 
The Work Programme, which goes live in 2011, is the government’s new initiative to 
help claimants return to work.  It replaces just about all existing welfare-to-work 
programmes, which will either not now proceed (eg Flexible New Deal) or be merged 
into the new scheme (eg Pathways to Work).  Operated by contractors to DWP, the 
Work Programme is expected to provide a range of services from tackling barriers that 
may be relatively easy to address, such as deficiencies in job search and interview 
technique, through to improving basic literacy and numeracy and mitigating health 
concerns.  Support will be on offer either on a mandated or voluntary basis, depending 
on the type and duration of benefit being claimed. 
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The Work Programme involves a new funding model where the payments to 
contractors for helping someone into employment will be made from the benefit savings 
actually realised.  The intention is that full payment will only be made after clients have 
been in continuous employment for 12 months.  There will also be stronger incentives 
for providers to work with the harder to help. 
The most commonly expressed concern about the viability of the Work Programme is 
its funding model.  The 'payment by results' approach, and especially the need for 
providers to wait at least 12 months before remuneration can be claimed, is likely to 
create unfortunate incentives.  The fear is that a lot of providers will respond by being 
selective at the front door, taking in only those most likely to find work quickly and 
excluding the most vulnerable and marginalised.  The institutional and human resource 
capacity to deal with the scale of activity required by the Work Programme is also an 
issue. 
And even if the Work Programme were to have sufficient capacity to deal effectively 
with all the claimants referred to it, the question remains as to whether there are 
sufficient jobs for them to move into. Even if there were to be an upsurge in 
employment, the geographical distribution of job opportunities is likely to be uneven.  
An obvious worry here is that most might be located in the stronger local economies of 
the South, far distant from the concentrations of benefit claimants in former industrial 
areas. 
 
 
A new job creation programme? 
 
It is difficult to be confident, therefore, that either a private sector revival or the welfare 
reforms set in train by the government will deliver a reduction in worklessness on the 
scale required in Britain’s weaker local economies.  In the circumstance, job creation 
schemes are an option that deserves serious consideration. 
 
It is important to be clear, in this context, about just what is meant by ‘job creation 
schemes’.  These are programmes that fund jobs that would otherwise not exist.  They 
may involve an important element of training but their primary purpose is to reduce the 
number out-of-work on benefits and at the same time undertake socially useful work.  
Traditionally, job creation schemes are delivered by the public and/or voluntary sectors.  
A private sector input is not impossible – and indeed has proved possible in some 
cases – but needs to be reconciled very carefully with EU state aid rules prohibiting 
subsidies to individual employers that may distort competition, though there are 
exceptions where the aim is to promote training or regional development for example. 
 
An example of a job creation scheme is the Future Jobs Fund, set up in spring 2009 
and due to be wound up at the end of March 2011.  This initially aimed to create 
150,000 temporary jobs, later raised to 170,000, targeted mainly at under-25s who had 
been unemployed for approaching a year.  The Fund was open to bids from public and 
voluntary sector bodies across the whole country, with local authorities expected to 
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take the lead in many cases.  The posts were full-time15, involved remuneration at the 
national minimum wage, and expected to deliver community benefits.  Participation in 
the programme was on a voluntary basis.  The government contributed £6500 per post, 
and each post was expected to last a minimum of six months.  Before the Fund was 
closed to new entrants in June 2010, DWP had issued contracts for more than 100,000 
posts. 
 
The Future Jobs Fund was in many respects a response to the specific circumstances 
of the recession.  However, after initial teething troubles, some arising from its hasty 
design and implementation, the Future Jobs Fund became regarded within DWP as a 
successful model that could in theory be applied more widely. 
 
If there were to be a new job creation scheme to reduce worklessness, what might it 
look like?  There are perhaps four factors that need to guide the selection of the target 
group: 
 
• The problem of large-scale, enduring worklessness is geographically 
concentrated so there is a good case for targeting the worst-affected areas.  
The worst 100 districts outside London, plus the worst 12 London boroughs, 
would be a good starting point. 
 
• Long-term JSA claimants are not the core problem, at least at the present time.  
The number of 1yr+ JSA claimants remains modest. 
 
• The number of lone parents on Income Support will anyway fall as planned 
reductions in eligibility kick in, and the remaining claimants with under-5s may 
be especially hard to shift because of the difficulties and costs of reconciling the 
competing claims of employment and childcare. 
 
• Incapacity benefits remain where the big numbers out-of-work on benefits are to 
be found.  This applies particularly to longer-term claimants. 
 
So the front-runner for a new job creation scheme would be one that primarily but 
perhaps not exclusively targeted incapacity claimants in Britain’s weaker local 
economies. 
 
But would there be enough potential takers to make such a scheme worthwhile?  What 
needs to be kept in mind here is that the numbers on incapacity benefits are huge – 
2.6m nationally and 1m alone in the worst 100 districts outside London.  Survey work16 
suggests that only around 30 per cent of IB claimants express an interest in working 
again, now or in the future, but even that equates to 800,000 claimants nationally and 
the proportion is likely to rise as welfare reform promotes greater labour market 
attachment. 
 
                                            
15
 A minimum of 25 hours a week. 
16
 C Beatty et al (2009) op cit. 
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Estimates from Sheffield Hallam University, published on a periodic basis since 199717, 
suggest that approaching 1m men and women on incapacity benefits are in effect 
‘hidden unemployed’.  These are the IB claimants who might reasonably be expected 
to have been in work in a genuinely fully employed economy.  Their benefit claims are 
legitimate and their health problems and disabilities are real, but in a different labour 
market context – the most prosperous parts of southern England – they would have 
almost certainly still been in work.  The most recent Sheffield Hallam estimates (for 
February 2009) put the GB total of hidden unemployed on incapacity benefits at 
510,000 men and 430,000 women. 
 
These men and women are disproportionately concentrated in Britain’s weaker local 
economies.  Table 10 shows the estimates for a selected group of districts.  The 
important observation is that in all these districts there should be no shortage of 
incapacity claimants who might be encouraged – or indeed might be only too keen – to 
take up work on a job creation scheme. 
 
There are practical issues that would have to be addressed if a scheme of this kind 
were to be introduced.  In particular, incapacity claimants have issues of health or 
disability that need to be taken into account in identifying appropriate jobs, and their 
health problems may need to be addressed directly alongside their training needs.  
Additionally, long durations out-of-work may necessitate a gradual and closely 
supported re-introduction to employment.  This is a very different group from the one 
targeted by the Future Jobs Fund.  On the other hand there is no reason to suppose 
that, with such a large potential client base, there would be any need to introduce 
compulsion and there is a growing body of experience from local schemes around the 
country on which to draw. 
 
 
Table 10: Estimated ‘hidden unemployment’ on IB, selected districts, February 2009 
 
  no. % of all adults of working age 
Barnsley 8,200 6.0 
Bolsover 2,600 5.7 
Barrow in Furness 3,100 7.1 
Doncaster 7,200 5.9 
Neath Port Talbot 6,700 8.2 
N Lanarkshire 11,600 5.7 
Blackpool 5,800 6.8 
Sunderland 8,900 5.1 
Copeland 2,100 4.8 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates 
 
                                            
17
 See for example C Beatty and S Fothergill (2005) ‘The diversion from ‘unemployment’ to ‘sickness’ 
across Britsh regions and districts’, Regional Studies, vol 39, pp837-854. 
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Costings 
 
How much would a job creation scheme cost?  The important point here is that the up-
front initial cost to the Exchequer is not the same as the net cost to the public purse.  
Moving an individual from benefits into employment leads to a reduction in the benefits 
bill and increases in tax revenue.  The net cost is therefore substantially smaller than 
the intial cost. 
 
Table 11 looks at the annual cost of supporting 100,000 jobs filled by former incapacity 
benefit claimants.  The assumption is that these jobs are all paid at the national 
minimum wage and that they are full-time (35hrs a week).  An allowance of £1,000 per 
job per year is also included for the set-up and running costs of the scheme.  The first 
part of the table shows that the up-front cost to the Exchequer would be just over 1.2bn 
a year. 
 
 
Table 11:  Estimated annual cost of 100,000 jobs for former IB claimants 
£m 
Wages 1,060 
Employers NI contribution 60 
Set up and running costs 100 
  
SCHEME COST 1,220 
Less savings on incapacity benefits 490 
Less savings on Housing Benefit 210 
Less savings on Council Tax Benefit 40 
Less Income tax revenue 80 
Less Employees NI contribution 50 
Less Employers NI contribution 60 
Plus Working Tax Credits 150 
Equals NET COST TO EXCHEQUER 440 
Source: DWP and Sheffield Hallam University 
 
The second half of the table shows the estimated savings and revenue that would 
accrue to the Exchequer.  The benefits savings have been calculated on the basis of 
average payments18 to incapacity claimants from DWP sources plus, in the case of 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, data on average payments and the 
proportion of IB claimants who also receive these benefits.  Income tax, national 
insurance contributions and Working Tax Credits have been calculated on the basis of 
earnings.  The calculations suggest that the net annual cost to the Exchequer of 
                                            
18
 Including Income Support as a top-up to incapacity benefits 
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100,000 jobs would be around £440m, or £4,400 per job.  This is not a great deal more 
than one-third of the up-front cost of a job creation scheme of this kind.  Furthermore, 
the calculations exclude any additional VAT revenue and excise duty arising from 
higher spending by participants on a scheme. 
 
The figure of 100,000 jobs is purely illustrative.  In effect, the calculations suggest that 
the net Exchequer cost of 50,000 jobs would be around £220m a year, for 200,000 jobs 
it would be around £880m, and for 300,000 just over £1.3bn.  In relation to the number 
of jobs that might be supported, and the impact on claimant numbers, these are 
arguably not large sums. 
 
The positive benefits of employment should also be thrown into the calculation.  Work 
is generally regarded as being good for individuals’ well-being, physically and mentally.  
It delivers identity and self-regard.  There is also the output from work itself – the 
services that would not otherwise be delivered to communities.  These have value too. 
And, of course, many participants on job creation schemes find that their experience 
equips them to progress into other employment. 
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3.  LOCAL CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barnsley 
 
Barnsley MBC, in South Yorkshire, has a population of 226,000.  Located roughly 
midway between Leeds and Sheffield, the borough is at the outer edges of both cities’ 
commuter hinterlands but in other respects is an important local economy in its own 
right.  Much of Barnsley borough covers the heart of the former Yorkshire coalfield and 
the area lost nearly 20,000 coal jobs between the early 1980s and mid-1990s.  There 
have since been sustained efforts to rebuild the local economy and there has been real 
progress in generating new jobs, though quite a number of these have been just over 
the borough boundary in neighbouring Rotherham and Doncaster. 
 
 
Statistical overview 
 
Barnsley ranks 39th among GB districts19 in terms of its working age benefit claimant 
rate, with 26,900 men and women out-of-work on benefits in 200920, a claimant rate of 
19.4 per cent of the working age population or just less than one-in-five of all adults 
between the age of 16 and state pension age. 
 
Table 12 breaks down the total into the main benefit groups and also shows the 
numbers on each of these benefits for at least a year.  In Barnsley, as in so many other 
older industrial areas, the benefit numbers are dominated by incapacity claimants.  This 
is particularly the case for 1yr+ claimants. 
 
Table 12: Non-employed working age benefit claimants, Barnsley, 2009 
   
 
Total 1 yr+ 
   
   
Jobseeker’s Allowance 7,100 700 
Incapacity benefits 16,000 13,800 
Income Support as lone parent 3,100 2,200 
Other income-based benefits 700 400 
   
   
TOTAL 26,900 17,200 
  
Figures are four-quarter averages 
Source: DWP 
 
                                            
19
 Pre-1999 districts.  If the districts subsequently merged into unitary counties are excluded, Barnsley 
ranks 35th. 
20
 Quarterly average 
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Figure 7: Working age benefit claimant rate, Barnsley, 1999-2009 
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Source: DWP 
 
 
Barnsley’s ranking has actually improved since 1999, when the borough had the 25th 
highest claimant rate in Britain21.  Figure 7 compares Barnsley with the national trend.  
Until the onset of recession, claimant numbers fell faster in Barnsley than in GB as a 
whole.  The recession pushed up the numbers again, locally and nationally, eroding 
nearly half the reduction in Barnsley’s claimant rate since 1999.  The increase 
associated with the recession was entirely among JSA claimants – between 2008 and 
2009 there was actually a small reduction in IB/ESA numbers while the numbers of 
lone parents on IS remained stable. 
 
In 2008/922 the employment rate – the share of adults of working age in work – in 
Barnsley was 67 per cent, about six percentage points adrift of the GB average and 11-
12 percentage points behind the average for the best 142 districts in the country.  To 
raise Barnsley’s employment rate to the national average would require an additional 
8,100 residents in work.  To raise the rate to the average in the best 142 districts would 
require an additional 15,800 in work. 
 
According to the latest figures (for December 2008) Barnsley has a total of just under 
69,000 jobs23 located within the borough.  As Table 13 shows, this figure is little 
changed since 1999.  Within the total, however, public sector employment24 has grown 
by 1,700 whereas the number of private sector employees has declined by more than 
twice this amount, leaving the public sector accounting for a third of total employment.  
This provides a slightly unfair picture of progress in economic regeneration because a 
great many of the new jobs in the sub-region have been located just across the 
borough boundary, for example in the Dearne Valley development that was actively 
supported by Barnsley MBC. 
                                            
21
 24th highest excluding recently merged districts 
22
 October 2008-September 2009 
23
 Employees in employment 
24
 Defined here as public administration & defence, health and education 
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Table 13: Employment in Barnsley, 1999-2008 
    
 
1999 2008 change 
    
    
Public sector 20,200 21,800 + 1,700 
Private sector 49,600 45,900 - 3,600 
    
    
TOTAL 69,800 67,800 - 2,000 
  
Source: ABI 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9 project working age claimant numbers in Barnsley through to 2020 on 
the basis of the four scenarios described earlier in the report.  The first set of 
projections are based on a resumption (and in some cases an acceleration) of pre-
recession trends.  The second set include the possible impact of public sector job cuts.  
As before, this is not an attempt to forecast what will happen but rather an attempt to 
explore what might happen, especially if the government is successful in bringing down 
benefit numbers. 
 
 
Figure 8: Positive scenarios to 2020, Barnsley 
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Source: Sheffield Hallam based on DWP data 
 
 
Because Barnsley experienced an encouraging reduction in benefit numbers prior to 
the recession, if these trends were to resume after 2010 further reductions in the 
benefit claimant rate might be expected.  By 2020 the working age claimant rate might 
range from 11-17 per cent, or 13-19 per cent allowing for the impact of public sector job 
cuts.  What is significant here, however, is that all these potential scenarios still leave 
Barnsley’s working age claimant rate in excess of 10 per cent, sometimes by quite a 
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margin.  Furthermore, if the impact of public sector job cuts is taken into account there 
seems little prospect of any significant reduction in the working age claimant rate by the 
middle of the decade.  For 2015, taking account of public sector job cuts, the 
projections are for a claimant rate of between 17 and 20 per cent compared with a 
starting point of 19.4 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 9: Realistic scenarios to 2020?, Barnsley 
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Source: Sheffield Hallam based on DWP data 
 
 
Specifically in the context of incapacity claimants, if there were to be a one million 
reduction in the headline GB total by 2015 as a result of welfare reforms, and if the 
local reduction were in line with the national average, Barnsley’s incapacity numbers 
would fall by around 5,000.  If half of these were then to claim JSA instead, the effect 
would be to increase Barnsley’s claimant unemployed by more than a third, from 
around 7,000 to 9,500. 
 
 
Local perspectives 
 
There is considerable scepticism in Barnsley about the prospects for a private sector-
led revival25. Although there is a high degree of uncertainty about what lies ahead, the 
typical expectation is that in the short term there will be a net loss of jobs.  The ‘best 
case scenario’ for the borough is seen as maintaining the job shortfall at the current 
level; the ‘worst case scenario’ would involve the loss of larger employers. 
 
                                            
25
 The research team interviewed eight key players in the Barnsley labour market including 
representatives of the council, the local development agency, Jobcentre Plus, and the private 
and voluntary sectors. 
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This perspective is rooted in difficulties in adding to the business stock and in growing 
existing businesses, in a dependence on public sector employment and in a recent 
decline in speculative investment in industrial and commercial flooorspace.  Only a few 
relatively small firms are known to be expanding, sometimes on the back of public 
sector contracts with an uncertain future, so the view is that there is an on-going need 
to encourage inward investment. 
 
Recent years in Barnsley have been characterised by “a steady trickle” of new 
investors rather than by major projects that have impacted positively on the local 
economy.  Furthermore, the job gains in the private sector have been countered by 
significant losses, notably among construction firms and at a major window 
manufacturer.  The 80 largest private sector employers in Barnsley are reported to 
employ 10,000 workers – down from 11,000 a year ago.  The local economy is 
however expected to be bolstered by the imminent arrival of ASOS, an online shopping 
company.  ASOS represents the largest single inward investment in Barnsley over the 
last 10-15 years, with a proposed 750 jobs to be created by March 2012 rising to 2,000 
by 2016. 
 
Office space has been a particular area of development over the last few years.  
Previously Barnsley did not have any top-quality office space, limiting the scope for a 
shift from manufacturing to services, but the borough has gradually acquired more, 
notably though EU-funded projects.  Even so, doubts are expressed about the extent to 
which the IT and cultural sectors might rescue the Barnsley economy, and about the 
limits of trying to compete with nearby Doncaster for jobs in distribution and logistics.  
At least to some extent, Barnsley’s strength is seen as a location where industries can 
keep down costs in difficult times.  
 
The other side of Barnsley’s efforts to bring down worklessness has involved sustained 
support for benefit claimants to re-enter the labour market, and on this front there is a 
growing body of positive local experience.  The consensus is that there have been lots 
of things that worked but the job outcomes have so far been small scale.  It is widely 
agreed, for example, that intensive one-to-one support for claimants has worked 
particularly well. 
 
Barnsley’s experience of implementing the Future Jobs Fund is a case in point – 
locally, this is seen as having worked "fantastically well".  By March 2011, when the 
funding expires, it is hoped that 200 people will be in on-going employment thanks to 
the Fund and an approach based on ‘wrap around support’.  Total job starts as at 
August 2010 were 298, of which 245 were men.  In Barnsley the Future Jobs Fund has 
been used to develop basic skills (literacy and numeracy) where necessary, and to 
promote self-esteem and confidence.  Local financial contributions to the programme 
mean that in Barnsley participation in the scheme lasts for 50 weeks instead of 26 
weeks. 
 
The strengths of the Future Jobs Fund are seen as voluntary participation, that the 
support for individuals is personalised once they have passed through the pre-
employment phase, and that implementation is local in nature, building on local 
knowledge and partnership structures.  The jobs available through the Fund that 
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appeal to ‘low or no skill’ people have been filled quickly.  Typical roles include street 
cleaners, care assistants, admin assistants, decorators, handypersons, facilities 
assistants and catering assistants. 
 
The main limitation of the Future Jobs Fund is seen as the extent to which the private 
sector is allowed to become involved.  If this barrier could be overcome the scope for 
job creation would be much larger – perhaps of the order of 1,000 in one view.  
Additionally, recent public sector cutbacks have resulted in the loss of 150 Future Jobs 
Fund places in the borough. 
 
In Barnsley, the voluntary and community sector is seen as doing well in terms of 
building partnerships and participation in back-to-work programmes, but the funding 
cuts are expected to impact hard because many voluntary and community 
organisations are dependent on public sector finance. 
 
 
Blackpool 
 
Blackpool, on the North West coast of England, is Britain’s premier seaside resort.  A 
recent study26 concluded that the local area has a greater concentration of jobs directly 
dependent on seaside tourism – more than 19,000 – than anywhere else along the 
coast of England and Wales.  Blackpool borough has a resident population of 140,000, 
but it sits at the heart of a larger built-up urban area including Lytham St Anne’s and 
Fleetwood with a total population of around 260,000.  Despite the size of the local 
tourist trade, the Blackpool economy is not without problems.  Work in tourism is often 
seasonal and low-paid, and Blackpool has lost at least some of what was once its core 
holiday business.  The tourist sector also continues to dominate employment in the 
town to an extent that is these days unusual for any one sector in an urban area of this 
size. 
 
 
Statistical overview 
 
Blackpool ranks 12th among GB districts27 in terms of its working age benefit claimant 
rate, with 18,900 men and women out-of-work on benefits in 200928, a claimant rate of 
22 per cent of the working age population or more than one-in-five of all adults between 
the age of 16 and state pension age.  This extremely high claimant rate places 
Blackpool in unusual company among the older industrial areas that dominate the list 
of districts with the highest rates.  Partly this reflects weaknesses in the local economy, 
and partly it will reflect residential segregation within the Greater Blackpool urban area, 
with Blackpool borough itself to some extent functioning as an ‘inner city’.  But there is 
also evidence that Blackpool’s benefit numbers are inflated by claimants who move 
                                            
26
 C Beatty, S Fothergill, T Gore and I Wilson (2010) The Seaside Tourist Industry in England and Wales: 
employment, economic output, location and trends, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University. 
27
 11th excluding recently merged districts 
28
 Quarterly average 
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there from elsewhere in the country, sometimes from the older industrial areas of the 
North29. 
 
Table 14 breaks down the total into the main benefit groups and also shows the 
numbers on each of these benefits for at least a year.  In Blackpool, as in so many 
other places, the benefit numbers are dominated by incapacity claimants.  This is 
particularly the case for 1yr+ claimants. 
 
 
Table 14: Non-employed working age benefit claimants, Blackpool, 2009 
   
 
Total 1 yr+ 
   
   
Jobseeker’s Allowance 4,400 400 
Incapacity benefits 11,000 9,300 
Income Support as lone parent 2,400 1,700 
Other income-based benefits 900 500 
   
   
TOTAL 18,600 11,900 
  
Figures are four-quarter averages 
Source DWP 
 
 
Blackpool’s ranking has actually deteriorated since 1999, when the borough had the 
30th highest working age claimant rate in Britain30.  Figure 10 compares Blackpool with 
the national trend.  Until 2006 the claimant rate was falling in Blackpool, though 
distinctly more slowly than across Britain as a whole.  After stabilising for a couple of 
years, the claimant rate then shot up again with the recession, effectively wiping out all 
the gains over the preceding ten years.  The increase associated with the recession 
was exclusively among JSA claimants – between 2008 and 2009 there was actually a 
small reduction in IB/ESA numbers while the numbers of lone parents on IS remained 
stable. 
 
In 2008/9 the employment rate in Blackpool was 71 per cent, which is actually quite 
high for a district with so many benefit claimants and only a couple of percentage 
points adrift of the GB average31.  Nevertheless, to raise Blackpool’s employment rate 
to the average in the best 142 districts across the country would still require an 
additional 5,700 residents in work. 
                                            
29
 See for example C Beatty et al (2007) Blackpool’s Incapacity Claimants, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam 
University. 
30
 27th highest excluding recently merged districts 
31
 This could point towards a proportion of claimants who work for a very few hours a week, perhaps in the 
tourist trade, which is something that is permitted under detailed benefit rules (subject to reductions in 
benefit payments above an earnings threshold) but would mean that they would be counted both as 
claimants and employees.  Sampling errors and biases in the Labour Force Survey (the source of the 
employment rates) may also play a part. 
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Figure 10: Working age benefit claimant rate, Blackpool, 1999-2009 
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According to the latest figures (for December 2008) Blackpool has a total of just under 
56,000 jobs32 located within the borough.  As Table 15 shows, this figure is more than 
3,000 down on the 1999 total.  Unusually public sector employment33 appears to have 
declined in absolute terms and as a share of total employment34. 
 
 
Table 15: Employment in Blackpool, 1999-2008 
    
 
1999 2008 change 
    
    
Public sector 23,400 21,300 - 3,100 
Private sector 36,900 35,400 -1,500 
    
    
TOTAL 60,400 55,700 - 4,600 
  
Source: ABI 
 
 
Figures 11 and 12 project working age claimant numbers in Blackpool through to 2020 
on the basis of the four scenarios.  The first set of projections are based on a 
resumption (and in some cases an acceleration) of pre-recession trends in benefit 
numbers.  The second set include the possible impact of public sector job cuts.  Once 
again, this is not an attempt to forecast what will happen but rather an attempt to 
                                            
32
 Employees in employment 
33
 Defined here as public administration & defence, health and education 
34
 These figures need to be treated warily.  In the early years of the Annual Business Inquiry, on which 
they are based, there was a history of misallocating jobs in central government agencies.  Blackpool has 
significant employment in this sector. 
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explore what might happen especially if the government is successful in bringing down 
benefit numbers. 
 
Because Blackpool’s benefit claimant rate fell only slowly prior to the recession, none 
of these projections suggest spectacularly large falls resulting from a resumption in pre-
recession trends.  By 2020 the working age claimant rate might range from 17-20 per 
cent, or 20-23 per cent allowing for the impact of public sector job cuts.  This compares 
with a starting point of 22 per cent.  Indeed by 2015, taking account of public sector job 
cuts, the claimant rate in Blackpool could be as high as 23-24 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 11: Positive scenarios to 2020, Blackpool 
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Source: Sheffield Hallam based on DWP data 
 
 
Figure 12: Realistic scenarios to 2020?, Blackpool 
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41 
 
Specifically in the context of incapacity claimants, if there were to be a one million 
reduction in the headline GB total by 2015 as a result of welfare reforms, and if the 
local reduction were in line with the national average, Blackpool’s incapacity numbers 
would fall by around 3,800.  If half of these were then to claim JSA instead, the effect 
would be to increase Blackpool’s claimant unemployed by more than 40 per cent, from 
around 4,500 to nearer 6,500. 
 
 
Local perspectives 
 
Blackpool perspectives on the prospects for a private sector-led revival invariably 
centre on the tourist industry35.  The town can point to positive developments in this 
regard, for example the involvement of Merlin, the second largest leisure operator in 
the world, in the management of Blackpool Tower, the Sealife Centre and Madame 
Tussauds.  The Winter Gardens are the subject of a heritage restoration and the 
redevelopment of the promenade is set to be completed by summer 2011.  Added to 
this, the continuing weakness of the sterling exchange rate raises hopes that more 
British holidaymakers will opt for ‘staycations’ rather than foreign holidays.  That said, 
visitor numbers had increased in 2009 but people seemed not to be spending greatly. 
 
However, as the public sector accounts for over a third of all jobs in Blackpool there are 
doubts as to how far the private sector can replace large scale job losses.  Given the 
relatively poor position of the underlying Blackpool labour market, even before the 
onset of public sector cuts, there are fears that the headline workless figures will rise 
further and that the gap between the local and national figures will widen. 
 
The need to capitalise on opportunities in other sectors of the local economy is widely 
recognised.  The preferred approach is to build on the existing tourism base but also to 
look for additional all-year-round activities   There are hopes that major physical 
regeneration projects, such as the Talbot Gateway project, will offer job opportunities, 
including a surge in construction employment and training.  Blackpool council’s 
collaboration with the local college has proved particularly effective in connecting large 
numbers of unemployed men to jobs in construction trades.  Other areas of potential 
local job growth include aerospace (though hopes here appear to be dashed by recent 
redundancies), Blackpool airport (though passenger numbers are down on a couple of 
years ago), the nuclear industry (where a local plant is a front-runner to supply 
components to a new generation of reactors) and call centres (where Blackpool’s 
peripheral location tends not to be a handicap).  Nevertheless, the local view is that all 
of these possibilities and more would have to be realised if public sector cuts were to 
be offset. 
 
On balance, the assessment is that the town will do very well to “break even” in the 
coming three or four years.  There is an awareness too that previous large-scale 
regeneration projects – the casino for example – haven’t always come to fruition.  In 
                                            
35
 The research team interviewed nine key players in the Blackpool labour market, including 
representatives of the council, Jobcentre Plus, the local college and training agencies. 
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addition, migrants from Eastern Europe and perhaps a flood of former public sector 
workers are seen as important competition for those on workless benefits. 
 
Over the last five years, efforts to foster job creation have been countered by job 
losses.  A national retailer, for example, moved its headquarters from Blackpool to 
Liverpool.  The care sector is a big employer, partly because people tend to retire to 
the coast, but the jobs are mostly low-paid and often part-time.  A local claims 
management company had grown from four employees to around 300 but such 
successes are seen as isolated and lacking the scale to impact on the overall level of 
worklessness. 
 
Blackpool does nevertheless have positive experience of fostering new firms: some 
500 start-ups have been established with backing from the council over the three years 
to 2010 as part of Local Enterprise Growth Initiative.  86 per cent of these businesses 
were still trading after two years. 
 
Like other places with large numbers on workless benefits, Blackpool also has 
substantial experience of projects aimed at assisting claimants back into work.  There 
have been some notable success stories. The Working for Health programme, for 
example, proved exemplary in moving Incapacity Benefit claimants into work though 
the numbers (around 60) were small.  Partnership working is much improved in 
Blackpool and said to be more ‘client focused’ with an increase in referrals between 
different organisations.  Where private firms have engaged there is evidence of 
success too, for example in a pre-employment programme for the long-term 
unemployed, run by the local college, which had links with a waste recycling firm and 
resulted in 60 out of 90 participants securing work.  
 
Local experience of the Future Jobs Fund has been mixed.  It is considered a success 
in engaging benefit claimants but the timing has proved unfortunate given cutbacks in 
public spending, which have limited the scope for taking on participants in a permanent 
capacity at the end of their six-month contract, and the lack of scope for private sector 
involvement is regretted.  The Future Jobs Fund is nevertheless said to have opened 
the eyes of employers to the fact that although some people have few formal 
qualifications they can still be very capable individuals who perform well and earn 
significant praise in many cases.  There is frustration that the intensive support 
associated with the Future Jobs Fund evidently works but that the funding is currently 
being wound up. 
 
There is a local view that national policy interventions are not always appropriate for 
Blackpool, and that “giant” outcome-driven contracts (as part of the Work Programme 
for example) can be unhelpful given what is known about the support needs of 
Blackpool residents and the positive outcomes of local initiatives.  The distinctive local 
features of worklessness in Blackpool include a high transient population living in 
houses in multiple occupation (often former hotels and boarding houses), a group that 
includes substantial numbers of in-comers, ex-offenders and drug users.  The seasonal 
nature of so many job opportunities is an issue too.  It is also felt that the government 
underestimates the scale of the support required by some people. 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evidence in this report shows that worklessness remains widespread in Britain’s 
weaker local economies.  Around one-in-five of all adults of working age are typically 
out-of-work on benefits in these places.  Furthermore, we are not talking here just 
about a few dozen disadvantaged communities – Britain’s ‘weaker local economies’, as 
defined here, include around a third of the entire UK population. Worklessness on this 
scale is a colossal waste of talent and a waste of productive potential.  It is also a huge 
drain on the Exchequer. 
 
During the long years of economic growth the trends were in the right direction – the 
numbers on out-of-work benefits were falling, and they were falling fastest in the areas 
where benefit claimant rates were highest, though progress was arguably far too slow.  
The recession has been a serious setback, and the prospects for a swift return to rapid 
economic growth presently seem poor. 
 
This creates an impasse in Britain’s weaker local economies.  Even on favourable 
assumptions involving a return to pre-recession trends, or indeed an acceleration in 
those trends, there seems little prospect of reducing worklessness on benefits to 
acceptable levels over the next ten years, let alone over the life of the present 
Parliament.  There also seems little prospect of a significant narrowing of the gap 
between worklessness in these weaker economies and in the more prosperous parts of 
the country. 
 
This is a moment, therefore, for bold new thinking.  The government recognises this 
and is implementing major welfare reform.  It is also looking to the private sector to 
generate the new jobs that are needed.  However, on both fronts the government’s 
hopes seem misplaced.  The welfare reforms are predicated on an assumption that 
there are plenty of jobs for people to fill.  This is a view that may hold in parts of 
southern England, where even now the economy remains fundamentally strong, but it 
seems wide of the mark in Britain’s weaker local economies.  Furthermore, for all the 
efforts to generate new private sector jobs in these places – and the efforts have been 
considerable over the last decade or so – the recent performance of the private sector 
does not inspire confidence.  The statistical evidence supports this view and it is 
certainly the perspective on the ground in the two case study areas – Barnsley and 
Blackpool – covered in the report.  The private sector has a mountain to climb to deliver 
new jobs on the scale that is needed, and it seems unlikely to get much beyond the 
foothills. 
 
Of course, every effort should be made to promote a private sector revival.  But the 
scale of the job shortfall in the coming years means that there is a powerful case too for 
job creation schemes.  What we’re talking about here is not just temporary 
programmes to provide training or work experience for long-term JSA claimants but 
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sustained job opportunities for a much larger group of men and women, especially 
incapacity claimants, who would otherwise stand little chance of gainful employment.  It 
is better to pay people to work, especially if they would like to work, than to pay them to 
stay on benefit. 
 
The economics of such a scheme are surprisingly positive.  As the calculations in the 
report show, the annual up-front cost of 100,000 jobs for incapacity claimants would be 
around £1.2bn, but the net cost to the Exchequer (allowing for benefit savings and tax 
revenue) would be around £440m.  This seems extraordinarily good value. 
 
There is no need to introduce such a scheme across the whole country.  Some parts of 
Britain, where the local economy is strong, probably don’t need help.  A good starting 
point would be to target the places with the highest claimant rate – in this report the 
100 worst districts outside London and the 12 worst London boroughs.  In every one of 
these at least 15 per cent of all adults of working age are currently out-of-work on 
benefits. 
 
In Barnsley and in Blackpool, and elsewhere in the country, there is positive experience 
of job creation schemes.  In these places the Future Jobs Fund, for example, is widely 
regarded as a success and there is a body of experience on which to build.  The Work 
Programme is the government’s preferred vehicle for helping claimants back into work, 
but it presently lacks any measures to boost the demand for labour in the weakest local 
economies.  If the government really does intend to bring down benefit numbers, this 
omission needs to be rectified. 
